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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
R O B E R T B. H A N S E N , 
Plaintiff, Respondent, 
and Cross-Appellant, 
\ Case No. 
13276 
PETROF TRADING 
COMPANY, INC., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E N A T U R E 
OF T H E CASE 
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact, Con-
clusions of Law, and Judgment of the Third District 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, dismissing 
with prejudice the Appellant's counter-claim against the 
Respondent which sought recovery against the Respond-
ent on the grounds of professional malpractice. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N O F T H E L O W E R COURT 
The case was tried on the 7th day of September, 
1972, and the counter-claim of the Appellant against the 
Plaintiff was ordered dismissed by the court on the 
grounds that the counter-claim of the Appellant was 
filed beyond the period of the Statute of Limitations. 
The request of the Respondent and Cross-Appellant for 
interest on the sum claimed due was denied by the court 
on the grounds that the Respondent and Cross-Appel-
lant had failed to comply with legislation requiring the 
disclosure of interest charges and on the grounds that 
the Respondent and Cross-Appellant had failed to in-
clude such interest charges in periodic billings to the 
Appellant. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
The Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower court 
ruling dismissing the Appellant's counter-claim and for 
an Order remanding the case to the Third District Court 
for the County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, for trial. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
In October of 1966, the Respondent was retained as 
counsel for the Appellant to collect a sum due to the 
Appellant from a Utah corporation, IRECO, Inc. The 
original cause of action was filed in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah for the Central 
Division in that the amount in controversy exceeded Ten 
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Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) and that the parties 
were residents of different states. In December of 1966, 
this original case was dismissed based on representations 
of the Defendant's counsel to the effect that a large pay-
ment had recently reduced the amount in controversy to 
less than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00). The 
representation was subsequently discovered to be false 
and the case was re-filed in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah and was styled Petrof 
Trading Company, Inc., v. Intermountain Research 
and Engineering Company, Inc., Case No. 116-67. 
During the discovery phase of Case 116-67, the Re-
spondent advised the President of the Appellant corpo-
ration to retain the services of Arthur H . Nielson as 
counsel for trial of the case. The Respondent assisted 
Arthur H . Nielson in the discovery proceedings of the 
case and performed his last service in Case 116-67 on 
approximately October 9, 1968. 
Case No. 116-67 went to trial and the Appellant 
corporation was successful in a portion of its claims. The 
case was appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit which substantially affirmed the finding of the 
District Court. 
During the appeal proceedings, and subsequent to 
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit, the president of the Appellant cor-
poration, Mr. Julius Petrofsky, reviewed certain court 
records and discovered a deposition which had been 
taken at the instance and request of the Respondent 
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which was never used in Case No. 116-67. Mr. Petrofsky 
also discovered other acts which may have constituted 
professional negligence on the part of Respondent and 
when this case was filed by the Respondent on July 31, 
1970, the Appellant began to develop the issues which 
subsequently led to the filing of a Second Amended 
Answer and Counter-Claim by Appellant's then counsel, 
Reese C. Anderson, on the 19th day of August, 1972, 
less than four (4) years after the last services rendered 
by the Respondent and less than four (4) years after 
the discovery by the president of the Appellant corpora-
tion of certain acts in the nature of professional malprac-
tice on the part of Respondent. The reply to the Second 
Amended Answer and Counter-Claim was filed by the 
Appellant on August 19, 1972, under the signature of 
the Respondent, Robert B. Hansen. 
The case had been set for trial many times and on 
the date of the filing of the Second Amended Answer 
and Counter-Claim and the reply to the Counter-Claim 
the case had been set for trial on the 7th day of Septem-
ber, 1972. 
On the 28th day of August, 1972, the Respondent 
raised, for the first time, the contention that the claim of 
professional malpractice was barred by the provisions of 
Title 78, Chapter 12, Section 25, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. That statute provides a four (4) year 
statute of limitations for claims such as the counter-claim 
of the Appellant for professional malpractice. The 
Amended Reply to Counter-Claim which raised the 
statute of limitations defense was received by counsel 
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for the Appellant less than one (1) week before the trial 
of the matter. 
At the trial on September 7, 1972, the Respondent 
presented his case-in-chief and the court advised the 
Appellant that argument would be necessary prior to 
taking evidence on the Appellant's counter-claim. 
Thereupon, the then counsel for the Appellant went for-
ward to present his evidence regarding the amount in 
controversy, payments which were made, over-charges 
which were claimed by the Appellant and subsequently 
proven. 
In accordance with the instructions of the court, 
counsel for the Appellant asked no questions designed to 
elicit evidence of the Appellant's counter-claim. At the 
conclusion of the evidence, the court required counsel for 
the Appellant to go forward with a proffer of evidence 
on which the Appellant's counter-claim was based for 
the sole purpose of determining whether or not the claim 
was barred by the statute of limitations. The court did 
not place the burden upon the Respondent to affirma-
tively prove facts showing that the statutes of limitations 
barred the claims of the Appellant. Upon receiving a 
proffer of evidence from the then counsel for the Appel-
lant and upon hearing arguments of counsel, the court 
found that the president of the Appellant corporation 
should have discovered the acts of alleged professional 
negligence and sought relief on those claims before the 
filing of the counter-claim on August 19, 1972. 
The court also found that the provisions of the Utah 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code applied to the interest 
5 
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sought by the Respondent inasmuch as no interest was 
claimed until after the Act went into effect on July 1, 
1969, and on the ground that a fair reading of the Utah 
Uniform Consumer Code and the statute under which 
the Respondent claimed interest led the court to the con-
clusion that the statute under which the Respondent 
claimed interest was modified insofar as it was inconsist-
ent with the provisions of the subsequent Utah Uniform 
Consumer Credit Code. The court also found that there 
was no agreement to pay interest for the professional 
charges and that the Respondent made no disclosure to 
the Appellant of its intention to charge interest until the 
filing of this law suit on July 31, 1970. 
After the filing of Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and a Judgment for the Respondent in the 
amount of Fifteen Hundred Ninety Eight Dollars and 
60/100 ($1,598.60), the amount of the judgment was 
paid by the Appellant and accepted by the Respondent 
in satisfaction of the Judgment. 
Post trial proceedings were conducted specifically 
directed to the applicability of the Statute of Limitations 
defense, post-trial relief was denied, and appeal was 
taken. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I. 
T H E T R I A L COURT E R R E D I N DISMISS-
I N G A P P E L L A N T - D E F E N D A N T S COUNT-
E R - C L A I M ON T H E GROUNDS T H A T T H E 
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S T A T U T E OF L I M I T A T I O N S H A D E X P I R -
E D P R I O R TO T H E F I L I N G O F T H E COUNT-
ER-CLAIM. 
The Statute of Limitations applied by the court to 
this case to bar the recovery of the Appellant on his 
counter-claim is 78-12-25 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, which provides a four (4) year statute of 
limitations. Counsel for the Appellant believes that this 
is the applicable statute of limitations for professional 
malpractice cases against attorneys. Throughout most of 
the courts of the United States and specifically in the 
courts of Utah, statutes of limitations defenses are to be 
affirmatively plead and proven by the party asserting the 
statute of limitations defense. DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 
2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962), Kimball V. McCormick, 
70 Utah 189, 259 P . 313, (1927), Thomas v. Glendin-
ning, 13 Utah 47, 44 P . 652, (1896), Tate v. Rose, 35 
Utah 229, 99 P.1003 (1909). 
The burden of affirmatively proving a particular 
fact requires the party asserting the fact to come for-
ward and produce evidence, either by testimony or by 
documents, to the effect that the asserted statute of lim-
itations applies. In the instant case, the trial court erred 
in shifting the burden to the Appellants to prove that the 
statute of limitations did not apply and, in fact, required 
the Appellant meet that inappropriate burden of proof 
by a proffer of evidence. In view of the very short notice 
given to counsel for the Appellant at the trial, sufficient 
time did not exist to prepare and martial the facts appro-
priate to such a demand by the court. In an effort to ob-
7 
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tain post trial relief, the president of the Appellant cor-
poration submitted a detailed affidavit of the evidence 
to be presented through his testimony. The affidavit is 
in the record detailing the claims of the Appellant. Sup-
porting documents and expert opinion evidence were not 
presented. Of course, the counsel for Appellant, during 
the trial, would not foresee the shift by the court of the 
burden of proof and, therefore, could not adequately 
prepare for the trial court's request. 
The Appellant contends that the trial court com-
mitted reversible error in shifting the burden of proof 
and in subsequently dismissing the Appellant's counter-
claim. 
The more substantial issue raised in this case is the 
question which this court finally resolved for medical 
malpractice cases in Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 
199, 436 P.2d 435 (1968). 
In Christiansen v. Rees, supra, this court adopted 
the so-called "discovery rule" for medical malpractice 
cases and specifically over-ruled all prior pronounce-
ments of the court on the issue. The trial court in the in-
stant case made no specific finding of the date on which 
the president of the Appellant corporation should have 
discovered the acts of professional malpractice which 
formed the basis of his counter-claim and instead made 
the general finding that the acts of negligence "should 
have been discovered" more than four (4) years prior 
to the filing of the counter-claim on August 19, 1972. 
Without appropriate evidence being taken under an ap-
propriate burden of proof, it was impossible for the trial 
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court to make specific findings of fact on that issue. 
Without such specific evidence and without specific 
findings, it was error for the court to dismiss the counter-
claim of the Appellant and forever foreclose the Appel-
lant from having his day in court on the allegations of his 
counter-claim. 
At the trial of the matter, all parties conceded that 
the last services rendered by the Respondent were per-
formed in September or October of 1968; a formal with-
drawal of counsel by Mr. Hansen was never filed, and 
he ultimately received payment from the Appellant in 
satisfaction of the judgment rendered in 116-67. Because 
of the relationship of trust between an attorney and his 
client, a client generally should not be expected to dis-
cover professional negligence on the part of an attorney 
until their relationship of attorney and client is termi-
nated. 
In Holland v. Morton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P.2d 
989 (1960), this court held that clients are under no duty 
to maintain a careful supervisory check on the actions of 
their attorney. In the relationship of trust between an at-
torney and his client, clients are entitled to trust their 
counsel and until that relationship of trust is terminated, 
there should be no expectancy that a client will discover 
an act of professional malpractice. 
The court concluded in Holland v. Morton, supra, 
that the attorney's duty to make a full and fair disclosure 
to his clients prevented the applicable statute of limita-
tions in that case from running until termination of the 
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attorney-client relationship or until discovery of the 
fraud. 
Holland v. Morton, supra, however, is not directly 
in point in this situation and does not resolve the issue for 
us of when the statute of limitations begins to run in a 
professional malpractice case against an attorney. 
In other states, courts have adopted the rule that 
the statute of limitations in professional negligence cases 
involving attorneys does not begin to run until termina-
tion of the attorney-client relationship. In Tuck v. 
Theusen, 10 Cal. App. 3d 193, 88 Cal. Rptr. 759 (1970), 
the California Court of Appeals held that the statute of 
limitations began to run on the day that the plaintiff ob-
tained new counsel and reasoned that the defendant's 
duty to render legal services ceased with the substitution 
of another attorney and since, until the time the attorney 
was replaced, he was under a continuing duty to correct 
any negligent acts which may have occurred during the 
relationship. In Keaton v. Colby, 27 Ohio St.2d 234, 
271 N.E.2d 772, (1970), the Ohio Supreme Court 
adopted the rule that the statute of limitations for pro-
fessional negligence cases against attorneys begins to 
run at the termination date of the attorney-client rela-
tionship. In Nellas v. Loucas, 191 S.E.2d 165, (1972), 
the Virginia court adopted the so-called "Termination 
Rule" in attorney malpractice cases and cited for author-
ity the decision in Keaton, supra, reasoning that until the 
attorney-client relationship terminates, the client has no 
duty to discover professional malpractice and bring a 
law suit while the attorney is in the employ of the client. 
10 
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In the case of Wilson v. Econom, 56 Misc. 2d 272, 
288 N.Y.Supp.2d 381 (1968), the New York court held 
that the continuing representation of a client by an at-
torney extends the statute of limitations during the 
period of the attorney's representation of the client and 
thereby adopted the " Termination Rule" in the State of 
New York. 
This court in Christiansen v. Rees, supra, discussed 
the same policy considerations which led the court to 
adopt the discovery rule in medical malpractice cases. 
Different policy considerations apply to the attorney-
client relationship inasmuch as a client generally has a 
trust in his attorney at least until the termination of the 
relationship and that until that basis is extinguished, 
either by the attorney's negligent acts or by the conclu-
sion of the case, the client is under no duty to assume 
that the attorney may have committed an act of profes-
sional negligence. 
In most cases, an attorney has exclusive custody of 
records, evidence, research and other pertinent materials 
to his client's case which are not usually available to 
others having the professional qualifications to deter-
mine whether or not an act of professional negligence 
has occurred. Without access to such materials, and par-
ticularly where an attorney has made representations to 
avoid the discovery by his client of negligent acts, a 
client cannot make a judgment of whether or not profes-
sional negligence has occurred. Conceivably, an attorney 
could "stall" or foreclose inquiry into his work until the 
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statute of limitations barred recovery under the rule ap-
plied by the trial court in the instant case. 
Justice Henroid, dissenting in Christiansen, supra, 
also raises the issue which should lead to the adoption of 
the termination rule for the State of Utah. In the dis-
senting opinion, Justice Henroid argues that, for ex-
ample, an error by an attorney in the examination of an 
abstract of title may not be discovered until many years 
after the act of negligence and that extending the statute 
of limitations for such an unreasonable period of time 
would work a hardship on both parties. 
Justice Henroid argues that the limitation rules are 
appropriately the function of the legislature. The legis-
lature, however, has not seen fit to foresee all of the pos-
sible situations in which statutes of limitations may 
apply. Therefore, the courts are called upon to construe 
certain common sense rules for the practical application 
of the legislative fiat. 
Adoption of the termination rule in Utah would pro-
vide, for example in the abstract of title situation, that 
the statute of limitations begins to run as of the date of 
the termination of the attorney-client relationship; i.e., 
on the date on which the attorney's services are com-
pleted in the examination of an abstract of title, and that 
actions against the attorney for malpractice would be 
barred four (4) years after the termination of that re-
lationship. Application of the termination rule to the 
facts of this case will result in a reversal of the lower 
court's opinion with instructions to determine the exact 
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date of the attorney's last services and to apply the 
statute of limitations accordingly. 
Unless the court adopts the termination rule, the 
courts of the State of Utah will be continually faced with 
the kinds of claims made in this case by the president of 
the Appellant corporation, to wit: That the representa-
tions by the attorney to him lulled him into a false sense 
of security, into believing that no acts of negligence had 
been committed, and that the course of professional rep-
resentation was proceeding in an appropriate fashion. If 
the courts are continually required to examine claims of 
professional negligence against attorneys where allega-
tions of fraudulent concealments are made such as those 
claims made in Holland v. Morton, supra, litigation 
could become time-consuming, costly and vituperative 
for the public, the courts, and the attorneys who are re-
quired to defend claims of fraudulent concealment. 
From every perspective, it appears that the court 
should adopt the so-called "Termination Rule" for the 
State of Utah and in so doing, should reverse the lower 
court's decision in this case and remand the case for 
further consideration. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Gerald H . Kinghorn 
K I N G H O R N , O B E R H A N S L Y 
& O'CONNELL 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Twelve Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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